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CAN WE PROTECT THE INNOCENT WITHOUT FREEING THE GUILTY?
THOUGHTS ON INNOCENCE REFORMS THAT AVOID HARMFUL TRADEOFFS
By Paul G. Cassell 1
Introduction
The other thoughtful Chapters in this book call for action to prevent factually innocent
defendants from being convicted at trial. These Chapters quite rightly draw attention to the
fundamental importance of the criminal justice system accurately separating the guilty from the
innocent. But the Chapters’ policy prescriptions, at least in some cases, rest on shakier ground.
In my contribution to the discussion, I address two points. First, protecting against
wrongful convictions can create tradeoffs. If poorly crafted, a reform measure might not only
prevent convicting innocent persons but also guilty persons, allowing dangerous criminals to
avoid incarceration and continue to victimize innocent persons.

From a public policy

perspective, these tradeoffs create concern that reform measures may be cures worse than the
disease.
With this caution in mind, I offer a second point: that it is possible to craft reforms that
help to protect the innocent without allowing the escape of the guilty. A common theme
underlying many of these proposals is that they reorient the criminal justice system away from
adjudicating procedural issues and toward considering substantive issues – i.e., issues of guilt or
innocence. The truly innocent will benefit in a system that values substance over procedure. We
ought to give serious consideration to measures that move the system in that direction.

I.

Comparing and Quantifying the Risk of Wrongful Conviction to the Risk of
Victimization

Two Kinds of Tragedies
In considering the issue of wrongful convictions, some broader perspective is useful. To
be sure, the conviction of even a single factually-innocent person is a tragedy. A grave and
serious injustice has been done whenever the criminal justice system wrongfully convicts and
1

Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. I
appreciate the helpful comments of participants in the Symposium on Wrongful Convictions and the DNA
Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing the Innocent at Northeastern University School of Law and Ron Allen,
Patricia Cassell, Sam Gross, Josh Marquis, Daniel Medwed, and Erin Riley. This research was made possible in
part through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.
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imprisons someone for a crime he has not committed. 2 But, sadly, this is not the only kind of
tragedy that the criminal justice system must be concerned about. 3 A properly-functioning
criminal justice system has to consider not only the suffering of those who have been wrongfully
convicted, but also those who have become (or will become) the victims of crimes.
Violent crime victims and their families also suffer almost unimaginable emotional and
physical pain—suffering that is often aggravated when the victim learns that the crime could
have been prevented through a more effective criminal justice system. I will resist the temptation
to appeal to the reader’s emotions by recounting the specific details of what happened to them.
The interested reader can easily find such unhappy details elsewhere. 4 And these kinds of
tragedies occur frequently. As Josh Marquis has observed, “[t]he justice system is far from
perfect and has made many mistakes, mostly in favor of the accused.

Hundreds, if not

thousands, have died or lost their livelihood through embezzlement or rape because the
American justice system failed to incarcerate people who were guilty by any definition.” 5
How to assess these competing risks is exceedingly complex.

Fortunately other

thoughtful observers have already done important spadework on this issue. An extremely helpful
discussion of the convicting-the-guilty-while-sparing-the-innocent tradeoff is found in Professor
Ronald J. Allen and Investigator Larry Laudan’s article Deadly Dilemmas. 6 They explain that
“[w]hile the prospect of convicting or executing a truly innocent person is horrifying, this type of
mistake occurs within a highly complicated matrix of relationships where other equally
horrifying mistakes go unnoticed in the conventional discourse.” 7 Allen and Laudan recognize
that some public policy reform measures that reduce the risk of convicting an innocent person
may simultaneously increase the risk that a guilty criminal will escape conviction and go on to
2

Like other authors in this book, I focus on so-called “wrong man” cases – i.e., cases of the “factually innocent” or
“actually innocent” persons being wrongfully convicted. See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent:” An
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523,
535 (1999). See also Michael L. Radelet, How DNA Has Changed Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, infra
(discussing conceptual issues surrounding innocence); Josh Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 500, 508-09 (2005); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2010).
3
See Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations on
Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1063 (2011).
4
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 629-30 (2009)
(collecting citations to examples of victim impact statements).
5
Marquis, supra note 2, at 517-18.
6
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 65 (2008). See also Larry Laudan &
Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010); Ronald J. Allen & Larry
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781
(2011).
7
Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 6, at 68.
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commit additional violent crimes.
I will join Allen and Laudan in focusing on this possible tradeoff—specifically, the risk
that putting in place measures to protect against convicting innocent persons will allow guilty
criminals to escape conviction. And I will likewise join them in narrowing the focus to a
particular risk when the guilty are not convicted—specifically, the risk that an unconvicted
criminal will go on to commit additional violent crimes (conventionally defined in the FBI’s
annual crime reports as murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault). Allen and Laudan have
even attempted a tentative quantification of the precise tradeoff that exists in the current structure
of our criminal justice system. Rather than try to reinvent the wheel here on quantitative
assessments of the tradeoff, I want to simply take the Allen and Laudan calculation as accurate.
In a separate article, I explore their numbers at greater length. 8
Allen and Laudan concretely calculated comparative risks of a person being wrongfully
convicted of a violent crime and being the victim of a serious crime. They derive an estimated
lifetime risk of being wrongfully convicted for a serious crime 9 of about 0.06% (6 out of
10,000). They then compare this figure to the lifetime risk of a person being the victim of a
violent crime – a risk of about 83% (or, for comparison, 8300 out of 10,000). Based on these
figures, Allen and Laudan conclude that “we can say with considerable confidence that the
[lifetime] risk of being the victim of a serious crime in the United States is significantly more
than 300 times greater than the lifetime risk of being falsely convicted of a serious crime.” 10

How to Think About Tradeoffs

What, then, to make of these estimated, and obviously very tentative, risk ratios? Of
course, one possible response is to attack the figures that Allen and Laudan derive. Professor D.
Michael Risinger, for example, has written a lengthy and interesting critique of the Allen and
Laudan calculation 11—a critique that I discuss at greater length elsewhere. 12 The Allen and
8

See Paul G. Cassell, Comparing the Risk of Wrongful Conviction for a Violent Crime with the Risk of Being the
Victim of a Violent Crime (manuscript on file with author).
9
Their calculation refers to rape specifically, but it appears to be generalizable to other serious crimes as well. See
id. at 80 n. 81.
10
Id.at 79-80.
11
D. Michael Risinger, Essay: Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 991 (2010).
12
See Cassell, supra note 8.
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Laudan risk ratio does not rest on definitive numbers. Instead, as Professor Marvin Zalman has
helpfully suggested, these kinds of calculations are estimates—perhaps akin to a National
Intelligence Estimate that is provided in a national security context. 13 But even assuming that the
criminal justice system suffers a much higher rate of erroneous conviction than Allen and
Laudan suggest, it is clear that the average person stands a vastly higher chance—by many
multiples—of being a victim of violence than a casualty of a wrongful conviction. What I want
to do here is assume that their calculation is roughly correct and tease out the implications.
Based on their risk ratio, Allen and Laudan contend that “insisting that we spare no
efforts to reduce the risk of false conviction—even if the necessary measures significantly
increase the risk of being a crime victim—is irrational.” 14 In response, Risinger contends that
the risk ratio of being a violent crime victim to being wrongfully convicted of a violent crime
“does not make much difference” because “some such substantially higher risk must always
attach to the risk of being a victim over the risk of being a convicted innocent simply as an
inevitability of any likely set of social arrangements in the real world.” 15
If I am reading Risinger correctly, I disagree with his position. The ratio victims to
wrongfully conviction will always be (and should always be) greater than one. But surely it
makes some difference in assessing proposed reform measures whether the ratio is in the
neighborhood of, let’s say, 2:1 or 300:1 (as Allen and Laudan suggested) or even more. Where
the debate in this country is over what set of “social arrangements”—i.e., what sorts of
innocence-protecting procedures ought to be place in criminal justice system—the size of these
potential tradeoffs matter. Indeed, Risinger himself does not appear to hold rigidly to his
position. In the penultimate sentence of his article, he makes a strong plea for adopting reforms
that “help significant numbers of innocent convicted innocents without seriously impacting the
rate of true convictions.” 16 Of course, making assessments about what are “significant” numbers
of innocent persons and whether an impact on the true conviction rate is “serious” requires some
consideration of the magnitude of the numbers involved.
Risinger stands on much stronger ground in explaining that reform measures for
addressing wrongful convictions can be divided into two categories with different moral
13

Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 226, 231
(2012).
14
Allen & Laudan, supra note 6, at 80.
15
Risinger, supra note 11, at 1016-17.
16
Id. at 1019.
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implications: Some reforms improve the diagnosticity of the system and thereby reduce the
incidence of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals or constitute reforms that protect
the innocent with no reduction in convictions of the guilty—reforms that should be relatively
uncontroversial. Other reforms, however, increase the protections for the innocent at the expense
of freeing more guilty persons—reforms that are more controversial precisely because of the
tradeoff involved. 17
The possibility that the most significant reforms will produce significant tradeoffs cannot
be overlooked. One concrete illustration (provided by Allen and Laudan) is reforms regarding
eyewitness identification.

This appears to be one the most common causes of wrongful

convictions. 18 And yet many of the reform measures to address the problem appear to carry with
them not only the prospect of avoiding misidentifications but also the possibility of discouraging
accurate identifications. 19

More broadly, as Professor Chris Slobogin has noted, “[m]ost

reformist energy has understandably been focused on reducing wrongful convictions, through
improved interrogation techniques, and identification procedures, defense involvement in the
investigative process, and the like.

Most of these reforms, however, could also increase

wrongful acquittals . . . .” 20
Fully assessing the tradeoffs involved between what might be called rightful convictions
and wrongful acquittals is an issue that dates back at least to Blackstone’s suggestion that it is
“[b]etter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” 21 A strong argument can
be made (and has been made by Risinger, among others in that long tradition) that the State bears

17

Id. at 1001.
The National Registry of Exonerations listed “mistaken witness ID” as the third leading cause of wrongful
convictions, trailing only perjury/false accusation and official misconduct. National Registry of Exonerations, %
Exonerations
by
Contributing
Factor,
available
at
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx#.
19
See Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 101
(2011); see also Laurie N. Feldman, The Unreliable Case Against the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications: A
Response to Judge Alex Kozinski, __ QUINNIPIAC L. REV. __ (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2684478. For a helpful summary of the reform possibilities in
this area, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTION THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG
248-52 (2011).
20
Chris Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 704 (2014); see also D. Michael Risinger
& Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 898 (2012) (problems with eyewitness misidentification are hard to be address because
they are “inherent in the phenomenon”).
21
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
173 (1997). For a recent and comprehensive effort to lay out a theoretical framework for evaluating such tradeoffs,
see Daniel Epps, The Consequence of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015).
18
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a “special responsibility to insure that innocents that it sweeps up in carrying out its crimecontrol functions are not convicted”—a responsibility that exceeds its obligations to prevent
crime that is the “free-will-based choice” of a criminal. 22
And it also seems likely that the societal costs of a single wrongful felony conviction are
higher than the societal costs of a single violent crime (setting aside the special case of
homicide). One way to quantify this point would be compare jury verdicts (or civil settlements)
in cases of wrongful conviction with jury verdicts in cases of criminal assaults. A recent study,
for example estimated the total tangible plus intangible pre-offense cost for different crimes (in
2008 dollars). The study concluded that the loss per crime victimization can be quantified as
$8,982,907 for a murder, $240,776 for a rape/sexual assault, $107,020 for an aggravated assault,
and $42,310 for a robbery. 23 Comparable data could be collected for wrongful conviction cases,
where substantial civil judgments (some of them larger than the numbers just cited 24) have been
entered in favor of those wrongfully convicted. A further quantitative refinement of the tradeoffs
discussed above would then be possible. 25
But adding to the complexities, there is a good possibility that releasing a guilty criminal
produces not a single violent crime, but rather multiple crimes. Criminals have high rates of
recidivism and, if not incarcerated, may commit dozens of crimes before caught. 26 Laudan, for
example, has estimated that “every false acquittal enables more than thirty-six crimes (including
on average seven violent ones) during the time when, but for the false acquittal, the defendant
would have been incapacitated.” 27
22

Risinger, supra note 11, at 1020. See also Allen & Laudan, supra note 6, at 81-84 (discussing arguments by
Ronald Dworkin and Immanuel Kant); Epps, supra note 21, at 1133-35.
23
Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and
Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 98, 105 tbl. 5 (2010); see also Ted R. Miller, Marc A.
Cohen & Brian Wiersema, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 tbl. 2 (1996)
(using older data to conclude that loss per crime victimization can be quantified as $2,940,000 for a murder, $87,000
for a sexual assault, and $19,000 for a robbery with injury). Cf. David A. Anderson, The Cost of Crime, 7
FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 209 (2012) (estimating total cost of crime in the U.S. at $3.2 trillion,
more than total health care costs). Similar figures from those quoted in the text come from the RAND Center on
Quality Policing, which calculates a cost per murder of $8,649,216, per rape of $217,866, per aggravated assault of
$87,238, and per robbery of $67,277. Paul Heaton, Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell
Us About Investing in Police, available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf (2010).
24
See, e.g., Limone et al. v, United States, No. 02-cv-10890-NG (D. Mass. 2007) ($101.7 million judgment).
25
Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of the Federal
Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1037-41 (2004) (discussing cost-benefit analysis in federal
sentencing based on victimization figures).
26
See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145-58 (1983).
27
Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable
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One other qualitative factor might also need to be entered into the calculation: The
general moral culpability of those who have been wrongfully convicted versus those who have
been victims of crime. The reader of this book, after seeing numerous accounts of wrongful
convictions, may wonder what he or she can do to avoid such a fate. While the other Chapters in
this book do not discuss the answer to this question in detail, it seems likely that the best single
answer is a simple one: Don’t commit a serious crime, particularly a crime of violence. While
the innocence literature does not highlight the fact, it appears that many of those wrongfully
convicted were convicted because they had committed other crimes—either at the time of the
crime for which they were wrongfully convicted or earlier. For example, prior arrests can
produce police photographs that can end up in a photospread to be misidentified. Or prior crimes
may arouse the suspicion of police detectives.
One prominent illustration of how the wrongfully convicted may have some moral
culpability is Anthony Porter, who was convicted of committing a drug-related homicide. But it
was apparently difficult for him to present a defense to that charge, because he may have been
committing an armed robbery in the same park at the same time. He ran from the park, gun in
hand, in full view of witnesses. Porter then denied not only the murder, but also being in the
park—a lie he maintained until after his convictions were affirmed. 28
The prevalence of criminal activity by those wrongfully convicted is suggested by a case
I recently worked on involving an alleged wrongful conviction of Robert Wilcoxson. 29 The
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission found Wilcoxson to be innocent of a drug-related
murder. But it appears that one reason he fell under suspicion is that (by his own admission) at
the time of the murder he was an armed cocaine dealer making tens of thousands of dollars from

Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195, 202 (Leslie Green &
Brian Leiter eds., 2011). But cf. Epps, supra note 21, at 1090-91 (critiquing this estimate).
28
See Marquis, supra note 2, at 517. Whether Porter was in fact innocent has been called into doubt by a new
documentary movie, A Murder in the Park. The documentary investigates the fact that Porter was released after a
Medill Innocence Project investigation obtained a confession from Alstory Simon to the murder—a confession that
led to Porter’s exoneration and Simon’s incarceration. But later Simon’s murder conviction was overturned, in part
because of the Innocence Project’s coercive investigative tactics had tainted the case against Simon. See Jim Stingl,
Duped by Medill Innocence Project, Milwaukee Man Now Free, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/duped-by-innocence-project-milwaukee-man-now-free-b99386015z1281852841.html.
29
Disclosure: I served as an expert witness for law enforcement officers involved in the civil litigation that resulted
from this case.
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his crimes. 30 Four other adults also fell under suspicion and were also convicted, wrongfully
they have argued. Still, it appears that they may have all have been involved in doing a series of
armed robberies at around the same time.31 Thus, in this one case, possibly involving multiple
wrongful convictions, it appears that all five of the allegedly wrongfully convicted participants
were involved in other dangerous crimes apart from the murder for which they were convicted,
which made it harder for them to convince authorities of their innocence.
The point here is not to blame those wrongfully convicted for their plight. The more
limited point is that, when assessing the priority to be given to competing claims between those
wrongfully convicted and those who are past (or prospective) crime victims, in the aggregate the
victims may have a far stronger claim. Some support for this position comes from a study
reporting that, for homicide and assault cases, the majority of the victims had no prior arrest
record, while the majority of the offenders did. 32
A related point can be made about the wrongfully convicted who have pled guilty.
Unless the defendant has entered an Alford plea (refusing to plead guilty but preserving his
position of innocence), he has almost certainly committed perjury before the Court in entering
his plea. Consider, for example, Robert Wilcoxson and Kenneth Kagonyera. 33 At their guilty
plea hearings, both swore under oath that they were guilty, that they were satisfied with defense
counsel, and that the other requisites for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea existed. So far as
the court records reveal, they also made no effort to enter an Alford plea. In addition, following
Kagonyera’s decision to plead guilty, he met with the prosecutor and, in the presence of defense
counsel made a very detailed statement about his involvement in the murder, implicating five
other people. 34 Kagonyera made these statements at his own initiative in an effort to convince
the District Attorney that he could provide useful information by testifying against his codefendants. 35

30

Deposition of Robert Wilcoxson, Wilcoxson v. Buncombe County et al., No. 1:13-cv-00224-MR-DLH (W.D>N.C.
2014).
31
Testimony of Damian Mills to North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, Dec. 18, 2013, at 481-82 (saying
that he had been doing a series of breaking-and-enterings with Kagonyera, Williams, Isbell, and Brewton).
32
See Arnite A. Varnedo, Characteristics of Offenders Arrested for Aggravated Assault, A Thesis Submitted to
Dep’t of Criminal Justice Administration, Atlanta Univ., at 8-9 (May 1987).
33
See North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, State v. Kagonyera/Wilcoxson, available at
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/kagonyera.html.
34
Memo. from Investigator Raymond to D.A. Moore regarding statement of Kenneth Kagonyera (Nov. 30, 2001)
(memorializing statements made on Nov. 29, 2001).
35
Kagonyera Dep. (1/9/15) at 134-35 (admitting this fact).
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To be clear, if Kagonyera and Wilcoxson were in fact innocent, 36 their guilty pleas were
plainly wrongful convictions. And no doubt, their pleas resulted from a plea bargaining process
that can be coercive and place considerable pressure on even innocent persons to plead guilty—
making the choice of an innocent person to plead guilty in some sense rational. 37

But

particularly where defendants (like Kagonyera and Wilcoxson) have made no effort to enter
Alford pleas, 38 a decision to mislead the Court and enter a guilty plea produces a wrongful
conviction that is, at least to some extent, the result of illegal choices on their part and
presumably entitled to somewhat less weight in social harm calculus. 39
I would like to see more discussion of and data on these questions, and particularly the
extent to which those wrongfully convicted had prior criminal records or were participating in
crimes at the time of the offense for which they were wrongfully convicted. (Similar data on
victims would be interesting too.) But the critical point here is that unraveling such competing
claims to priority in reform promises to be very difficult.
In this short Chapter, rather than embark on what would be a complicated effort to
precisely quantify tradeoffs for particular reforms, I would like to search for reforms that help
protect the innocent without freeing the guilty40—reforms that ought to be relatively
uncontroversial, at least for those (including many of the authors in this book) who prioritize
innocence issues over other values in the criminal justice system. 41 I agree with those who argue
that the risk our criminal justice system poses to the innocent is not trivial. 42 But as the above
quantification suggests, neither is the risk to crime victims, who bear the brunt of any failures of
the system to apprehend or prosecute dangerous criminals. It is against that backdrop that I turn
to possible reforms that try to carefully attend to both sides of the equation. 43
36

The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission has found both men to be factually innocent.
Compare Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) with Stephanos Bibas,
Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 54 (2008) (responding to Bowers’ article)
38
Currently about 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system allow Alford pleas. See Stephanos
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1351, 1372-73 n.52 (2003).
39
It is also possible that they choose to plead guilty to the murder because they were guilty of other serious, violent
crimes. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
40
I also search for reforms that do not reduce punishment for the guilty. Cf. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell,
Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing for reduction in mandatory minimum sentences, a
reform that might not only shorten sentences for the guilty but also reduce pressure on innocent defendants to plead).
41
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED,
PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012).
42
Risinger, supra note 11, at 999.
43
See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges
37
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II. Protecting the Innocent While Simultaneously Convicting the Guilty

In light of the risk of potential tradeoffs between convicting the guilty while protecting
the innocent, the reforms that are most likely to be justified on cost-benefit analysis will be those
that do not present any significant risk of increasing crime victimization rates. I have previously
offered some thoughts on how this might be done. 44

This short section highlights a few

promising possibilities.
More Research on the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful Convictions

At the top of my list of measures to address the problem of wrongful convictions of the
innocent is further research on the extent and causes of the problem. 45 In the previous section, I
noted the Allen and Laudan calculations, which rested on very thin data. 46

For public policy

purposes, we need more information—information about, for example, wrongful convictions
through guilty pleas (a key part of the Allen and Laudan estimate) and solid information about
the incidence of wrongful convictions outside the areas of homicide and rape.
The additional research needs to focus on the frequency of false confessions. Professor
Samuel Gross has aptly observed that “[t]he most important question about false convictions is
also the most basic: How frequently are innocent people convicted of crimes?”47 To be sure, on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first DNA exonerations, we now have far more information
about wrongful convictions than in the past. But even disregarding the questions about how
“innocence” is determined in some of this research, 48 a more fundamental problem is the fact

Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 134 (2008) (arguing that the goals of convicting the
guilty and protecting the innocent are not mutually exclusive).
44
See generally Cassell, supra note 3.
45
Others have made similar pleas. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
663, 689 (2007); see also Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV.
955, 983-993 (2014) (outlining research agenda for innocence issues).
46
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111
PNAS 7231 (May 20, 2014) (noting Risinger study, relied upon by Allen and Laudan for error rate, ultimately is
based on only 11 cases of wrongful conviction).
47
Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2008).
48
Compare Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21, 72–75 (1987) (presenting cases of alleged execution of the innocent), with Stephen J. Markman &
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988)
(questioning the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”); compare also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe,
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that a collection of alleged miscarriages based on DNA or any other factor may not be
representative of the processing of cases in the American criminal justice system. 49
To avoid this problem, researchers could take a random sample of a large number of
felony criminal violent crime cases (1,000 seems like a good number) and then track them
through the system to see what happens. 50 While it might not be possible to follow all 1,000
cases carefully, it would seem likely that the cases where a defendant might plausibly be
innocent would shrink the numbers down fairly rapidly. Researchers could focus on this subset
of cases and try to come up with an initial, plausible number of cases in which a wrongful
conviction was even a possibility, and then perhaps press even further to try and get to the
bedrock truth in this subset of cases. This methodology has already been employed in other
countries in the false confessions area. 51 It should be tried on the broader subject of wrongful
convictions. Research of this type might be very valuable for revealing both the scope of the
wrongful conviction problem and particular areas where wrongful convictions are prevalent. This
would permit a targeted response to the problem, perhaps more narrowly addressing the risk to
the innocent without freeing the guilty. 52
Refocus Post-Conviction Relief on Claims of Factual Innocence
One of the great problems for the innocence movement is trying to find the needles in a
large haystack—that is, trying to identify innocent persons in a criminal justice system that
processes mostly guilty defendants. Some commentators have made a frontal assault on this
The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (presenting cases of alleged wrongful
convictions from false confessions), with Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of
Alleged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 1999 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999)
(questioning the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”).
49
See George C. Thomas III, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, infra; Samuel R. Gross &
Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital
Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008).
50
Others have proposed creating a commission to study cases of proven wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Keith A.
Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W.
L. REV. 333 (2002). My proposal is slightly different because I propose to conduct research to expand our
knowledge about a random sample of wrongful convictions, rather than simply study the nonrandom sample of
wrongful convictions that have already come to light.
51
See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False Confessions Occur?: An Empirical
Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIM & L. 21, 25 (1994).
52
For example, I have previously proposed that we should pay particular attention to issues involving alleged false
confessions by the mentally retarded, rather than overgeneralizing the problem and proceeding on the assumption
that false confessions are a routine product of police interrogation of those with normal mental faculties. See Cassell,
supra note 2, at 580–87.
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problem by proposing that we limit access to some forms of judicial review to those who are
making claims of actual innocence. For example, two distinguished legal scholars—Joseph
Hoffmann and Nancy King—proposed that federal habeas corpus review of noncapital state
court convictions and sentences should, with narrow exceptions, be abolished except for those
who couple a constitutional claim with “clear and convincing proof of actual innocence.” 53
Relying on a comprehensive study of federal habeas corpus filings, 54 they found that only seven
of the 2,384 noncapital habeas filings in the study (0.29%) resulted in a grant of habeas relief,
and one of those seven was later reversed on appeal. 55 Hoffmann and King argued that habeas
review of such claims “currently squanders resources while failing to remedy defense-attorney
deficiencies. Those resources should be redeployed where they have a more meaningful chance
of preventing the deficiencies in the first place.” 56 They propose moving resources to indigent
defense representation instead of largely pointless habeas litigation.
Hoffmann and King’s proposal is similar to others that have tried to focus habeas corpus
on protecting the innocent. Most famously, Judge Henry Friendly argued that federal habeas
relief for most constitutional errors should be conditioned on a showing of innocence. 57
Interestingly, he also proposed that a sufficient demonstration of innocence should itself be a
basis for habeas relief, 58 an issue that has bedeviled the Supreme Court in recent years. 59
Similarly, Professors John Jeffries, Jr. and William Stuntz have suggested allowing defaulted
federal claims to be raised in federal habeas where those claims raise a reasonable probability
that the defaulted claims resulted in an erroneous conviction. 60 Professor Samuel Gross has

53

Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
791, 820 (2009).
54
NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2007),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
55
Id. at 52, 58, 115–16.
56
Hoffman & King, supra note 53, at 823.
57
See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 143
(1970).
58
Id. at 167.
59
See Joshua M. Lott, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
443 (2011). The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the
guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398
(1993) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). Nonetheless, there has been enough uncertainty about
that statement that more than one hundred freestanding innocence claims have since been filed in federal habeas
courts. See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 121, 131 (2005).
60
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990).
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argued for giving defendant claiming innocence the option for an “investigative trial,” in which
the defendant would be able to argue his innocence, provided he waived important rights—in
exchange, the defendant (if convicted) would be given greater freedom to raise post-conviction
claims of innocence. 61 And most recently, in this book, Professor Stephanie Hartung has argued
for a post-conviction “innocence track” in federal habeas, under which any prisoner who
establishes innocence by a preponderance of the evidence would be entitled to a blanket
exemption from procedural bars. 62
One of the interesting things about post-conviction review is that, by definition, it cannot
interfere with the process of convicting the guilty at trial. Accordingly, post-conviction review
offers a particularly promising approach for escaping the tradeoffs highlighted earlier. 63
One proposal worth serious exploration combines aspects of the Hoffmann and King
proposal, along with Judge Friendly’s insight that federal habeas should focus on innocence and
Professor Hartung’s idea for an innocence track. We could restrict federal habeas to those who
have a colorable claim of factual innocence. Those prisoners could then be required to establish
factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence and, if they did so, they would have a
blanket exemption from any procedural bars to raising claims for relief in federal court. 64 I
would also add to Hartung’s innocence track the idea that if a prisoner who had proven he was
innocent did not receive federal habeas relief, the federal courts could at least remand the case
back to the prisoner’s State Supreme Court for further inquiry as to whether state relief might be
available.
Professor Hartung (and others) may wonder about why the innocence track needs to be
coupled with the abolition of federal habeas for those who are raising claims unrelated to
innocence. The answer is straightforward: time, energy, and resources are limited. Given
Hoffmann and King’s finding that federal habeas relief for procedural violations is essentially an
impossibility, it make no sense to allow those claims to continue to be pressed before federal
courts. Restructuring federal habeas so that it only concerns prisoners alleging factual innocence
would help federal courts re-conceptualize their mission to the benefit of wrongfully convicted
61

Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or
Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011).
62
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in Innocence Reform, infra.
63
A similar point can be made in support of Professor Warden’s proposal to give close attention to post-conviction
recantation by trial witnesses. See Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, infra.
64
For an interesting effort along these lines in the area of direct appeals, see Helen A. Anderson, Revising Harmless
Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 391 (2011).
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prisoners—precisely the sort of change that helps the innocent without freeing the guilty. It
seems almost irrefutable that the innocent will benefit from a system concentrating on them—
that is, that we can find needles more effectively in smaller haystacks.
Increasing Resources for Indigent Defense Counsel and Prosecutors to Focus on Issues Relating
to Actual Innocence
On the issue of wrongful convictions, the elephant in the room is little discussed but
obvious: money.

The root cause of wrongful convictions is almost certainly insufficient

resources devoted to the criminal justice system. Whatever individual causes might be
pinpointed in particular cases, more resources would often have enabled defense counsel (or
police and prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence. 65 If this diagnosis
is correct, then an important part of the true solution to the wrongful conviction problem may be
devoting additional resources to the criminal justice system. 66
Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it may be an academic
proposal to call for significant new funding for defense attorneys, for example. 67 At a macro
level, the funds devoted to the criminal justice system are probably roughly fixed and not much
is likely to change in the near term. 68 What is needed, then, is to prioritize innocence over other
criminal justice expenditures. Fortunately, for those who truly believe in “innocentrism,” there
are ways to do this—as I discuss in the next several sections.
Abolishing the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, and Consequently Shifting Defense
Resources Away from Litigating Purely Procedural Claims
If we want the criminal justice system to prioritize the issue of innocence and devote
more resources to it, then a good start would be to consider abolishing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. Abolition of the rule and replacing it with a system of civil damage remedies

65

See Robert Gehrke, If Utah Doesn’t Provide Better Legal Defense for the Poor, ACLU May File Lawsuit, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 20, 2015, available at http://www.sltrib.com/news/2966774-155/if-utah-doesnt-provide-betterlegal (discussing case of wrongful conviction in Utah where overworked public defender was apparently unable to
obtain alibi witnesses).
66
See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, infra.
67
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 1031, 1059 (2006); Paul Cassell & Nancy Gertner, Public Defenders Fall to the Sequester, WALL ST. J., Aug.
20, 2013 (urging that federal public defender funds not be sequestered).
68
See Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897 (2007) (noting a common
assumption that there are fixed resources devoted to criminal justice).
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has been advocated by such distinguished legal figures as Chief Justice Warren Burger, 69 Dallin
Oaks, 70 Akhil Amar, 71 Bill Pizzi,72 and Paul Robinson. 73 The classic argument for abolishing the
exclusionary rule is that the rule sets criminals free because the constable has blundered. 74 But
there is a more subtle, and in many ways more pernicious, defect to the exclusionary rule. Under
a regime that allows the “deliberate exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process,” 75 defense
efforts will move toward issues involving the validity of evidence collection rather than toward
assessing the quality of the evidence itself. Professor William Stuntz perhaps most famously
made this point in his writings, explaining how a system with limited resources that emphasizes
procedure over substance will give short shrift to factual claims of innocence. 76 Stuntz is
cautious in his argument. As he explains, the current system does not simply involve a direct
tradeoff, but rather “places substantial pressure on [defense] counsel to opt for the procedural
claim rather than the (potential) substantive one.” 77 But Stuntz’s bottom-line conclusion seems
unassailable: there is some tradeoff in the current regime favoring procedural claims over
substantive ones. 78
In addition to these kinds of tradeoffs, the exclusionary rule creates a perverse screening
at trial. 79 Jurors deciding cases may believe that a weak prosecution case actually is the result of
the exclusion of evidence. Because of facts such as these, it seems difficult to contest that
“actually guilty defendants are most likely to benefit from the exclusionary rule.” 80

69

See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500–01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 739–40
(1970).
71
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 40–45 (1997).
72
See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN
EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (1999).
73
PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE
WHAT THEY DESERVE (2006).
74
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587(N.Y.1926).
75
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
76
William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,
37–40 (1997).
77
Id. at 40.
78
Professor Robert Mosteller responded to Stuntz’s argument by reporting his own experience that motions to
suppress “posed only a minimal drain on defense resources.” Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of
the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 955–
56 (2010). But Mosteller concedes that his experience comes from a system in which motions to suppress were set
on the eve of trial, thereby preventing most such motions from being litigated. Id. at 956. Such a system seems
atypical to me. For example, in both the state and federal systems in Utah, motions to suppress are typically litigated
well in advance of trial and thus often produce contested suppression hearings.
79
Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 633 (2015).
80
Id. at 636.
70
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Given these tradeoffs, those with an innocentric view of the world should be the first to
jump on the replace-the-exclusionary-rule-with-civil-damages bandwagon. Surely the experience
of the rest of the world suggests that the exclusionary rule is not the only way to restrain police
abuses. 81 There is good reason to think that we can craft a damages regime for protecting Fourth
Amendment rights that will fully preserve them, just as we rely on a damages regime to protect
other civil liberties, such as our First Amendment rights. 82
Once procedural issues regarding the legality of searches are diverted to the civil justice
system, the criminal justice system would gain substantial new resources to devote to innocence
issues. While the percentage of cases in which the exclusionary rule results in guilty criminals
going free is disputed, 83 it does not appear to be disputed that the exclusionary rule results in
“tens of thousands of contested suppression motions each year.” 84 Instead of filing and litigating
these motions that have nothing to do with innocence, defense counsel could turn their attention
to substantive issues about who committed the crime. Prioritizing substantive issues of guilt and
innocence over procedural issues of the reasonableness of searches is exactly the way the system
should be structured—and a way the both increases the chance of convicting the guilty while
reducing the chance of convicting the innocent.
Replacing the Miranda Regime with the Videotaping of Custodial Interrogations

The problem of procedure over substance is not confined solely to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The same flaw has developed in confession law. Here again, those who are most
concerned about innocence should be skeptical of the law’s current structure, which relies largely

81

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when adopted, the
exclusionary rule was “unique to American jurisprudence” and that “a categorical exclusionary rule has been
‘universally rejected’ by other countries”); see also William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U.
COLO. L. REV. 679, 717-29 (2011) (discussing limited use of exclusionary remedies in Canada, New Zealand,
England and Ireland).
82
See AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27–29 (1998) (explaining why the
exclusionary rule is a bad way to deter police misconduct compared to a civil damages regime). Cf. Yale Kamisar,
Mapp v. Ohio 50 Years Later, NAT’L L.J., June 13, 2011, at 50 (arguing that critics of the exclusionary rule may not
really want an effective alternative remedy because it would be just as burdensome on law enforcement).
83
Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (arguing that the small percentage researchers deal with
masks the large number of felons released from prison based in part on illegal searches and seizures), with id. at 950
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that only a very small percentage of all felony arrests are declined for prosecution
on grounds of potential exclusionary rule problems).
84
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting William Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1997)).
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on Miranda warnings and waivers to protect against coercive interrogations. As a practical
matter, this approach does little to help the innocent and prioritizes litigation about Miranda
compliance over litigation about the accuracy of confessions. The result has been a regime that is
not particularly well-suited to address “false confession” issues 85—i.e., is not well-suited to
protecting the innocent. Today Miranda “serves mainly to distract lawyers, scholars, and judges
from considering the real problem of interrogation, which is how to convict the guilty while
protecting the innocent.” 86
The “central problem with Miranda is that it was not crafted specifically to prevent false
confessions, but rather to regulate interrogations more generally.” 87 The problem starts with the
probability that innocent defendants are most likely to waive their Miranda protections. Innocent
persons have nothing to hide from the police, and so they almost invariably waive their Miranda
rights. 88 Once they waive their rights, the Miranda procedures do little (if anything) to restrain
police questioning techniques, a point that seems to be generally accepted. 89
Miranda’s procedural requirements, like those of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, also shift defense attorney time and attention away from claims of innocence. The Miranda
procedures have spawned considerable litigation about whether a suspect was in “custody,”
whether a suspect “waived” his rights, or whether a suspect “invoked” his right to counsel. 90
These issues generally have little to do with the reliability of any confession that police might
obtain through questioning. Thus, like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, these issues
tend to draw defense attorney attention toward raising claims about process rather than about
substance. 91

85
See generally Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from Lost Confessions and False Confessions – And from
Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998). .
86
Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551, 566-67 (2007); see
also Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 (2006).
87
Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656405.
88
See Cassell, supra note 85, at 539–40.
89
Christopher Slobogin, Towards Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (arguing that Miranda has had an
“immunizing” effect on deceptive interrogation tactics); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 97–98 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 437 (1989).
90
See 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRO. 1, 179–99 (2014) (collecting approximately 400 recent federal court of
appeals cases on Miranda issues).
91
See Stuntz, supra note 76, at 44 (advancing the argument that Miranda doctrine causes shift of attention away
from defendants with factual issues to raise and toward defendants with procedure claims to raise).
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Miranda has also turned the attention of trial judges away from questions of the
reliability of confessions and toward questions about police compliance with the Miranda rules.
As Professor Welsh White has observed, before Miranda, reliability “played an important role in
our constitutional jurisprudence . . . . [Since Miranda], however, courts and legal commentators
have largely ignored issues relating to untrustworthy confessions.” 92 To be sure, as a matter of
black letter law, the Miranda procedural requirements were piled on top of traditional
voluntariness requirements. But as a practical matter, judicial attention is a scarce resource.
Miranda has created a triumph of formalism.93 Prioritizing one set of claims (Miranda
compliance) has inevitably reduced scrutiny of the others—to the disadvantage of innocent
defendants. As Professor Steven Duke has explained, not only is Miranda “virtually useless”,
but it “replaced a vibrant and developing voluntariness inquiry that took into account the
vulnerabilities of the particular suspect as well as the inducement and conditions of the
interrogation.” 94 The bottom line is that “not only has Miranda allowed the police to disregard
actual voluntariness, it has enabled the courts to be equally unconcerned with actual
innocence.” 95
One last injury to the innocent defendants is worth noting. Good reasons exist for
believing that Miranda has significantly hampered the ability of police officers to obtain
confessions from guilty criminals. 96 This has not only harmed law enforcement’s ability to
convict guilty criminals but also the opportunity of innocent individuals to use those confessions
to exonerate themselves. 97 For example, Professor Gross has noted that the number of
exonerations when the actual criminal confessed declined sometime between the mid-1950s and
the early 1970s. 98 Gross cites among the possible causes the Miranda decision, which “may
92

Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 156 (1997).
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JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 206–16 (1996).
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Duke, supra note 86, at 564.
95
Jacobi, supra note87, at 12.
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See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996);
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects
on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
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See Cassell, supra note 85, at 550–52.
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Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 430–
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result in some reduction in the number of confessions.” 99 Thus, by impairing the system’s ability
to get to the truth in cases, Miranda has caused the innocent to suffer.
A system that respects the constitutional right against self-incrimination, while at the
same time providing greater protection for innocent suspects, could be easily designed. There
appears to be wide agreement that video recording interrogations would offer far greater
protection for innocent suspects than does the current Miranda regime. 100 I made a proposal long
ago for substituting video recording of police questioning as a substitute for Miranda, based in
part in the need to protect the innocence. 101 Other commentators have proposed that recording
should supplement Miranda. 102 A fair number of jurisdictions are moving forward with requiring
video recording of at least some interrogations, 103 although recording is often left to the
discretion of police officers or mandated only for very serious crimes.

The “Innocence

Movement” could speed the adoption of this important reform if they would highlight the extent
to which Miranda does not offer effective protection to the innocent and suggest that, instead, we
should use video recording.
Moving in this direction has the great advantage of not interfering with the conviction of
the guilty. It appears that video recording does not greatly interfere with the ability of law
enforcement to obtain confessions and, of course, if the Miranda rules were relaxed or replaced
by video recording, there would be an unambiguous boost to prosecution efforts. As a result,
this kind of reform would not only avoid the tradeoffs discussed above, but would indeed be a
true “win-win”: more convictions of the guilty, while fewer convictions of the innocent.

Requiring All Defense Attorneys to Directly Ask Their Clients, “Did You Commit the Crime?”
and Aggressively Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence

31 (1987).
99
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100
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A critical resource in the efforts to prevent wrongful convictions is defense attorneys.
Yet the great bulk of innocence literature seems to focus attention on prosecutors as the source of
the problems. 104 For example, in his Chapter in this book, Professor George Thomas calls
prosecutors “the thin last line protecting the innocent.” 105 And he is surely right that prosecutors
have critical steps they can take to reduce wrongful convictions, such as by fully discharging
their Brady obligations to produce exculpatory evidence (a point I have pressed elsewhere). 106
But the Innocence Movement has largely overlooked what may be an even more
important bulwark against false convictions: defense attorneys. Unfortunately, the mindset of
the defense bar toward the question of whether their clients are in fact guilty has been aptly
described as one of “staggering indifference.” 107 Indeed, it is sometimes even argued that it is
inconsistent with ethical obligations for defense counsel to focus on innocence. 108 Defense
attorneys simply cannot consider whether their clients are guilty, it is argued, because doing so
would impair the quality of the representation they provide. 109 And, more broadly it is argued,
focusing on innocence issues may distract society from dealing with mass incarceration and
other issues associated with the guilty. 110
I am unconvinced. Innocent persons ensnared in the criminal justice system have a
stronger claim to our attention than do the guilty. If we want to structure an “innocentric”
criminal justice system that gives highest priority to preventing the conviction of the innocent,111
defense attorneys must be involved. In fact, defense attorneys—who (unlike prosecutors) have
constant and direct access to defendants—may be uniquely positioned to identify a miscarriage
of justice before it happens and take steps to prevent it. They are also well-poised to increase the
“diagnosticity” of the system, by helping to flag the relatively small percentage of cases in the
system genuinely involving factual innocence claims. 112
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Here is one example of how we might think about reorienting defense counsel toward
innocence issues. Many defense attorneys do not directly ask their clients whether they are guilty
of the crime charged. 113 This ignorance may permit defense attorneys to perhaps raise defenses
that might otherwise be barred by rules of legal ethics. 114 But why should we give defense
counsel such freedom if we are trying to structure a criminal justice system that focuses on
innocence? It is hard to see what larger societal interest is served by allowing counsel to move
forward in ignorance of this important fact. It may be true, as some defense advocates have
argued, that a defense attorney can never be sure whether her client is telling the truth when a
defendant claims to be innocent. 115 But requiring defense attorneys to at least ask that basic
question would serve the valuable function of putting this issue squarely out in the open, helping
innocent defendants. And the only “cost” is that defense counsel for some guilty defendants
might be limited in the kinds of arguments that can be advanced at trial—a cost that society
surely ought to be willing to bear to have a system that more accurately sorts the innocent from
the guilty.
Simply requiring the defense attorney to ask this straightforward question probably
would not make much of a change in the current system. Part of the current criminal justice game
seems to be for defendants to deny their involvement in a crime—at least at the start of a case.
For example, Professor Robert Mosteller reports that, when he was a defense attorney, virtually
all of his clients claimed to be innocent until he recited the advantages of a specific plea offer; at
that point, they conceded their guilt. 116 In light of this fact, maybe defense attorneys should be
required not only to ask their clients if they committed the crime but to also explore more
thoroughly whether a defendant is truly guilty or innocent. This requirement could be enforced
by a rule that only if a defendant admits he is guilty would a defense attorney be permitted to
explore a standard plea bargain. 117 Such a requirement might promote more frank and open
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discussion between defense attorneys and their clients about whether they were involved in the
crime.
Forcing defense attorneys to truly attempt to learn whether their clients are guilty or
innocent would create a real advantage: it would give the criminal justice system one more
opportunity to begin sorting innocent defendants from guilty ones through the one person who
has the best access to important information—the defendant. Professor Mosteller may properly
complain about how defense attorneys have difficulties obtaining access to witnesses and other
forms of evidence, 118 but the barriers to information are not all one-sided. Prosecutors are usually
precluded from talking to defendants once legal counsel enters the scene. But defendants are
obviously in a unique position to provide information that can sort the guilty from the innocent.
If defendants can be induced to provide more thorough information to their attorneys about
whether they are innocent or guilty, then the system can more effectively protect against
wrongful conviction.
With the innocence issue directly on the table for discussion, how should defense counsel
proceed when her client reports that he is innocent? Professor Mosteller rightly bristles at the
suggestion that there should be some sort of “second-class treatment” of defendants who state
clearly that they are guilty. 119 He explains quite nicely that defense counsel have important
duties to perform in the criminal justice system, even when performing the far more common
duty of defending those who have in fact committed the crimes charged against them. But he
interestingly goes on to discuss the idea that perhaps individual defense attorneys—or the
criminal justice system more broadly—should try to devote additional resources to cases in
which a defendant has a good claim of actual innocence. 120 Of course, defense attorneys—and
the system—are not well-positioned to do this if the defendant is not even asked whether he is in
fact innocent.

If a defendant claims to be innocent, as a first step defense counsel obviously ought to
adequately investigate the claim. Presumably adequate defense investigation happens in many
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cases, 121 regardless of whether a defendant claims to be innocent or guilty. But if some defense
attorneys are not squarely raising the innocence issue because they think ignorance is tactically
useful, they may end up missing a chance to discover exculpatory evidence that could set a
defendant free. 122
Following such an investigation, defense counsel should obviously rely on the procedures
available in our criminal justice system for presenting a defense. Within our traditional structure,
defense attorneys have many tools that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients.
But in reviewing cases of wrongful conviction over the years, one omission from the
defense repertoire has always puzzled me. I have always wondered why, in a rare case where a
defense attorney believes she is representing a truly innocent client, she almost invariably fails to
bring the prosecutor into the discussion. The wrongful conviction literature suggests it is unusual
for a defense attorney to communicate her specific concerns directly to a prosecutor. 123 Perhaps
this is part of a larger culture of distrust between prosecutors and defense attorneys that appears
to afflict at least some jurisdictions. 124 But direct communication on this issue needs to be
strongly encouraged. 125
It would, of course, be naive to think that defense counsel reports to prosecutors could
prevent every wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant. But I am surprised to discover that
defense counsel so rarely employ this approach. Perhaps an unfortunate reason is that defense
attorneys behave in the way that Mosteller suggests: they simply do not view their job as having
much to do with guilt or innocence. 126 If defense attorneys proceed in this way, they never learn
whether they have an innocent defendant for a client as opposed to a guilty one. This agnostic
approach may help to avoid burnout on the job or allow for an increased feeling of self-worth, as
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some have argued in justification. 127 But this strikes me as a something of a cop-out, leading the
Innocence Movement to point fingers first at errant prosecutors and rogue police officers while
too often ignoring the role of ignorant defense attorneys. If we wish to leave no stone unturned in
our efforts to prevent conviction of the innocent, it is time to broaden our perspective to include
defense attorneys as those who have special responsibility – and special abilities – to prevent
wrongful convictions. 128

Conclusion
Preventing wrongful conviction of the innocent is a fundamental priority of our criminal
justice system. But it is obviously not the system’s only goal. Efforts to prevent conviction of
the innocent should avoid interfering with other objectives, most prominently the need to convict
the guilty and prevent the suffering of future crime victims. Comparing even rough estimates of
the risk of a person being wrongfully sent to prison for committing a violent crime with the risk
of becoming a violent crime victim suggests that the current tradeoffs between the two may
incline dramatically toward increasing victimization.
But there are some kinds of reforms that can avoid debate about these tradeoffs – true
“win-win” measures that simultaneously reduce the number of innocents wrongfully convicted
while increasing (or least not decreasing) the number of violent criminals sent to prison. This
Chapter lays out a few such possibilities, including confining habeas relief to those with claims
of factual innocence, replacing the exclusionary rule with a civil damage remedy, moving
confession law away from technical Miranda procedures, and requiring defense attorneys to
explore their clients’ guilt or innocence. If we are truly committed to protecting the innocent, we
can and should take such specific steps. We can reduce the risk of wrongfully convicting the
innocent without setting free the guilty.
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